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What is social about social work?
Martin O’Brien1
Abstract: It has been argued that the applied nature of social work renders the appreciation 
of social theory by practitioners as unnecessary. This paper takes issue with this 
controversial stance and shows how social work itself can not be understood outside of the 
social context in which it is located. This social context, however, is said to be changing: the 
world in which we currently inhabit is vastly different to that of our immediate forbears. 
This has prompted social work theorists to consider the implications for the profession 
and the role of practitioners. This paper refl ects upon the underpinning principles of the 
competing perspectives and concludes that, given the complexities involved as well as 
the responsibilities with which social workers are charged, social theory is an essential 
component of the practitioner’s education.
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This paper originates in a presentation for a symposium held at Lancaster 
University on 16th-17th September, 2004. Its aim is to explore some problems 
in contemporary social work theory and, in particular, some intersections 
between social work theory’s diagnosis of its contemporary contexts, on the 
one hand, and wider themes in social science, on the other. My argument 
is that theory is fundamental to social work practice and that theoretical 
sophistication is a necessary foundation for any claim that social work has 
a progressive remit. An effective illustration of the intrinsically theoretical 
character of social work can be found embedded in the very title of the 
symposium for which this paper was developed. The event was headed 
Changing Social Work – a phrase that betrays several different possible 
meanings. For example, it might be taken to designate a refl ection on ‘changing 
social’ work: that is, an exploration of work that is applied to a social that 
is changing in some way. Alternatively, it may be taken to refer to changing-
social work: that is a consideration of a kind of work that somehow changes 
the social. Or, again, it may be taken to indicate a discussion of changing 




There are, of course, several more possibilities but already it is clear that 
to follow through the implications of each of these meanings in any serious 
sense requires some theoretical sophistication. Exactly how much is required 
is open to debate but it requires at least some. How much more sophistication, 
then, is demanded to grasp the personal, cultural, economic and historical 
infl uences that push and pull the lives and life-chances of social services user 
groups? I pose this question right at the outset because when I was doing the 
research for the paper I encountered a statement from Minister for Health, 
Jacqui Smith, who suggests that:
Social work is a very practical job. It is about protecting people and changing 
their lives, not about being able to give a fl uent and theoretical explanation of 
why they got into diffi culties in the fi rst place. (Jacqui Smith, the Minister for 
Health, quoted in Crawford & Walker, 2003: vii)
Now, I have no diffi culty in accepting the suggestion that social work is a 
practical activity but I do have two problems with Jacqui Smith’s formulation 
of it. First, theoretical fl uency is portrayed here in opposition to practical 
competence and, I suggest, a burden on that competence. It is something that 
social work is ‘not about.’ This seems a somewhat strange idea because if social 
work is about changing people’s lives – if it carries that political duty – then it 
is crucial that social workers are theoretically sophisticated. Changing people’s 
lives is not something to be done lightly. At the very least, it is preferable for 
social workers to provide ‘fl uent and theoretical’ explanations for what they 
are doing, rather than explanations that are incoherent and illogical.
Second, whatever readers of this paper think personally about the value of 
theoretical fl uency, it remains the case that Jacqui Smith has actually identifi ed 
and validated a tension that runs through social work: how can the practical 
activity be understood and what are its consequences. The tension is most 
clearly visible in social work’s ‘practice theory’ – where the overall aim of 
social work, à la Jacqui Smith, is to change people’s lives and the context 
where the changes occur is the ‘social.’ Thus, on the one hand, there is an 
enormous quantity of literature devoted to exploring the work (‘practice’) 
of social workers. On the other hand, there is very little that explores what, 
precisely, is social about that practice or what it means for a practice of any 
description to be social. As will be seen, the fi eld is not entirely devoid of 
analysis and refl ection on the social character of social work but it is certainly 
unbalanced. Writing on the social part of the social work equation is a minor 
motif that makes periodic appearances in the literature only to disappear again 
before re-emerging in a different guise at a later date. This observation, of 
course, begs the question of why the practice is called ‘social work’ at all – why 
not public relief, resource planning, family and community support, local 
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authority welfare work, contextual correction, or similar? If social work is 
devoid of a body of theory and analysis about why it is social, then by what 
authority or for what purpose is that appellation self-proclaimed?
But the tension identifi ed by Jacqui Smith is also visible in social work’s 
‘meta-theory’ – where social work refl ects upon itself and on how it fi ts into 
more expansive sociological pictures of the world inhabited by its clients and 
its users. Witness David Howe, for example, writing on precisely the question 
that is at the heart of this paper:
In their day-today practice, social workers face a busy and complex world of 
human behaviour in a social context. It is a world in which relationships break 
down, emotional needs run high, and personal needs go unmet. It is a world 
in which some people have problems and some people are problems. (Howe, 
1997, p.170, my emphasis)
I suggest that the shades of agreement between David Howe’s meta-
theoretical exploration and Jacqui Smith’s practical injunction are not 
(primarily, at least) the consequence of some shared personal ideology. 
Rather, they are indicative of deeper problems in social work theory itself. 
In particular, they indicate a deal of ambivalence and anxiety about what the 
context of social work practice is and how (if at all) it is changing.
Note that I am not suggesting either that models of the social in social 
work literature are somehow remiss, or that the ordinary sociological models 
employed by social workers in their day-to-day practice are inadequate for the 
job. What I am interested in are those cases where the ‘social’ part of social 
work is expressed in a ‘fl uent and theoretical’ manner because I suggest that 
these models defi ne the ways that social work understands how and why 
people ‘got into diffi culties in the fi rst place.’ Or, at least, this is where social 
work attempts to articulate its most coherent visions of this process.
In pursuit of this analysis, the exploration of social work’s ‘social’ component 
is divided into three parts. First, I look at some contemporary sociological 
themes with a view to situating social work theory in a wider framework of 
thinking about change in the contemporary world. Second, I look briefl y 
at work that has been done on the historical emergence of the social as a 
discrete arena of public and private intervention. Where did the ‘social’ – as 
something that could be worked on or in or through – come from? Third, I 





Across the 1980s and 1990s a series of interrelated ideas spread throughout the 
social sciences and, to a lesser extent, became part of public discourse about 
the contemporary world. These ideas included modernisation, globalisation, 
risk, networks, time-space compression, and many more. In general, the 
proliferation and diffusion of these ideas signalled something of a shift in 
sociological theories of the economy, culture, nation and identity. In particular, 
it signalled a conceptual stampede to grasp the specifi city of the present time 
and assert a vision of the forces driving contemporary social change. The new 
vision depicts the contemporary world as infi nitely more complicated than, 
and disconnected from, its past: it is a world where uncertainty abounds and 
diversity reigns.
Witness Habermas, not the most pessimistic of commentators by a long way, 
for whom the contemporary world comprises a ‘post national constellation’ 
of ‘disempowered’ states and ‘global economic networks’ that have dissolved 
standardized living conditions and career patterns (2001. pp.69-71, 81, 155). 
It is a world of global and local exclusions, of fragmented political allegiances, 
individualised consumption-driven lifestyles and absent solidarity where 
fortressed and fractured communities drift apart from each other under the 
weight of chronic income insecurity. This diagnosis draws, in part, from the 
work of Manuel Castells who argues that a new kind of society has grown in 
the soil of the information revolution. According to Castells (1997. p.1) the 
world we inhabit today:
… is characterised by the globalization of strategically decisive economic 
activities. By the networking form of organization. By the fl exibity and instability 
of work, and the individualization of labour. By a culture of real virtuality 
constructed by a pervasive, interconnected, and diversifi ed media system. And 
by the transformation of material foundations of life, space and time, through 
the constitution of a space of fl ows and of timeless time, as expressions of 
dominant activities and controlling elites.
This ‘network society’ has cut the historical roots from beneath communal 
identities, is disintegrating civil society, debasing state sovereignty and 
evaporating democratic politics (Castells, 1997. pp.59, 66, 307, 349). Indeed, 
so complicated has the present world become that, according to Urry (2003), 
it is:
… epistemologically and ontologically unknowable, with efforts at 
comprehension changing the very world that is being investigated. (p.16)
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In spite of being unknowable, Urry suggests that it is a world of ‘diverse 
networked time-space paths’ and ‘emergent systems possessing properties and 
patterns that are often far from equilibrium.’ It is a world where ‘unpredictable 
and yet irreversible patterns seem to characterize all social and physical 
systems’ (Ibid: 7-8). So strange and unfathomable is this world that even 
the word science is placed in speech marks to denote its uncertain status and 
the concepts of society and the social are deemed inadequate to the task of 
its description.
Perhaps these formulations exemplify the kind of ‘fl uent and theoretical’ 
explanations that were in Jacqui Smith’s mind when she argued for the value 
primacy of social work’s practical side. There seems little doubt that there is a 
great perceptual and emotional distance between a ‘real virtuality’ in a ‘diverse 
networked time-space path’ and, for example, introducing a grieving person to 
a bereavement support group or placing a child on the ‘at risk’ register – and 
suspicion of theoretical sophistication, at least initially, may appear justifi ed 
on these grounds. But social work is about much more than individual well-
being – whether this is explicitly acknowledged or not – and shares with 
sociology a basic irresolution both about the world in which it is practised 
and about the implications of the seemingly monumental transformations 
identifi ed therein. Furthermore, theoretical language – in sociology and 
elsewhere – is intended at least partly to supply greater conceptual precision 
to widely voiced propositions about the state of the world we live in. What 
may appear as abstract and abstruse generalisations when plucked from their 
sociological context are in fact formalised statements of the logical relations 
between claims and counter-claims about what the world is ‘really’ like.
I make this point because recent writings on social work and social welfare 
share wider sociological diagnoses of the contemporary world, even if the 
sociological foundations of the diagnosis are not always acknowledged. Social 
work theory concurs with Urry’s assessment of a fundamental unknowability 
about the world and Castells’s insistence upon its novel complexity. So, for 
example, there is a tendency to posit a past that was simpler, more stable, 
more solid and less fl uid than our globalised, networked, mobile present and 
to claim that ‘old certainties’ (however limited they were) have disappeared 
to be replaced by a ‘confused eruption’ of uncertainties (see Howe, 1996: 96; 
Hugman, 2001: 323; Dominelli, 2004: 3). Indeed, Parton makes the theme 
of uncertainty the organising principle of his edited collection, remarking 
on the extraordinary ‘pace and intensity’ of change (1996: 4) and on the 
‘increasing diversity, uncertainty, fragmentation, ambiguity and change’ 
(ibid: 12) currently being experienced in social work. Nor, of course, is the 
infl uence of these ideas limited solely to sociology and social work. The 
diagnosis of lost certainties, increased confusion and fragmentation is an 
organising theme of a great deal of social scientifi c and related commentary 
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and analysis. There are many persuasive and memorable formulations of this 
diagnosis but I have chosen to quote from Jock Young’s The Exclusive Society 
(1999) where, borrowing from Hobsbawm, he depicts recent social change 
as a failure of the ‘compass’:
The movement into late modernity is like a ship which has broken from its 
moorings. Many of the crew cry to return to the familiar sanctuary of the 
harbour but to their alarm the compass spins, the ship continues on its way 
and, looking back, the quay is no longer so secure: at times it seems to be 
falling apart, its structure fading and disintegrating. The siren voices which 
forlornly, seriously, soberly try to convince them that going back is possible 
are mistaken. (p.193)
The ship sails on but no-one knows where it is headed, the compass spins 
and points in no direction, there are no moorings to secure the vessel to 
anything solid and familiar. Beautifully written and typical of contemporary 
social scientifi c rumination on recent social change. The ‘movement into 
modernity’ (late or otherwise) is presented in the third person neutral – as 
something independent of the actions, thoughts and beliefs of the author  – and 
it is the author’s task to get a handle on the meaning or substance of the altered 
(and usually degraded) present. The quoted section is reminiscent of, and 
intellectually derived from, the various formulations of the same alleged 
phenomenon provided by Zygmunt Bauman who has spent over a decade 
lamenting the lost inclusiveness of the immediate post-war era.
It could be observed that this period in European history was not, in fact, 
as all-inclusive as contemporary commentary might be taken to imply: that 
endemic and institutionalised racism was a fundamental building block of 
everyday life; that strict sexism excluded many women from a wide range 
of male-dominated institutions and blamed their feminine failure for the 
problems with which they had to contend; that, in spite of increased social 
mobility, social class remained (and remains) one of the most decisive factors 
in your life chances; that religious affi liation divided communities and states 
in antagonistic and sometimes violent ways; that widespread poverty had 
not, in fact, been eradicated and that there were serious and life-harming 
divisions in access to income and wealth. All of this is true but it misses a 
crucial point. What is lamented in Young’s (and Bauman’s) writing is not so 
much the actuality of post-war social life as the dream of social belonging 
through which it was grasped. It is the dream of inclusiveness or, at least, a 
particular version of it that is ‘fading and disintegrating’ and no longer looks 
like a secure intellectual harbour in which to anchor ideas, beliefs and theories. 
What Young and Bauman see as impossible is a return to that dream – in 
which, in the context of the present paper, the welfare state in general, and 
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social services in particular, were meant to assist people to ‘bring about a 
more comfortable ‘fi t’ between themselves and constant social change’ as the 
Gulbenkian Working Party on community work (1968: 29) put it, and to 
empower people to take control over their own lives and circumstances.
This dream is precisely the dream of social administration – the acceptance 
that change is inevitable but that it can be managed in such a way as to encourage 
collective solidarity and sustain a comforting sense of stability within whilst 
the maelstrom whirls without. If social workers were able to understand and 
work with the ‘individual-within-their-situation’, as Younghusband (1978) 
and others suggested, they might contribute to the progressive development 
of the wider society: incremental societal improvement could advance through 
episodic situational triumph. Although dependent on earlier articulations 
of social work’s progressive remit, the strong thesis – that social work could 
contribute to societal advancement through its mundane encounters with 
the disadvantaged – fl ourished in the context of the post-war settlement and 
appeared as both a justifi cation for and the realisation of the liberal democratic 
welfare compromise. Here, what is administered in social administration 
and what is serviced in the social services is collective solidarity. The ‘social’ 
comprises the links in the great chain of support that attaches each individual 
to the society at large.
What has thrown social work, alongside sociology, into confusion is the 
shattering of this dream and the disintegration of its terms of reference. The 
death of a dream, particularly one so infl uential and entrenched as this, 
deserves serious and considered attention beyond what I am  able to supply 
in this paper. The following preliminary exploration is concerned with the 
dream’s origins and contents – where did it come from and what were its 
constituent images? – and with its replacement – what images have been 
substituted and how do they re-present social work’s social content?
Some origins of the social
I do not intend to provide a full-blown genealogy of the social. Not only has 
this exercise been attempted before by Donzelot (1979) and, to a lesser extent, 
Ignatieff (1978) and Garland (1985) but the purpose of the present paper  is 
to address more contemporary developments in social work thinking. Here, 
there follows only a brief summary of some of the more important themes 
in the emergence of an idea of the social with the aim of drawing some few 
lessons from history.
In his book Keywords Raymond Williams (1976) traces the cultural, 
literary and philosophical development of the concept of ‘society’. Observing 
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that its early usage owed much to the bourgeois cultural habit of seasonal 
gatherings and functions – where the bourgeoisie considered themselves 
to be ‘in society’ – Williams goes on to note the expansion of this idea to 
refer to arranged, structured or formalised collective enterprises. Eventually, 
partly because of this formalisation, the term ‘society’ is used by Tönnies to 
distinguish the associative confi guration of industrial, urban collective life 
from the communal confi guration of agricultural, rural life.
But the concepts of ‘society’ and ‘the social’ do not develop in exact parallel. 
In particular, the notion that there is a specifi c realm or area of human life 
that is indubitably ‘social’, which can be transformed by ‘social reformers’ 
and, later, worked on by ‘social workers’ is the product of a very particular 
historical vector. This vector, moreover, diverges from the philosophical 
development of the concept of ‘society’ as a totality of rules, customs and 
rankings that binds people together and to which all members can be 
made to belong. The latter idea of society was an important conceptual and 
ideological resource in the political struggle between the aristocracy and the 
emerging bourgeoisie in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century and 
its intellectual utility for early social reform movements is well described by 
Ignatieff (1978). At base, it contains the proposition that all men and women 
are capable of just and good conduct – that criminals, paupers and the mad 
are not ‘incorrigible’ – and that by manufacturing the right (mental and 
social) associations crime can be curtailed, madness cured and pauperism 
(all but) abolished. The ’reformation of men’, suggests Bentham comprises 
a ‘species of manufacture’ where an effi ciently operating engine of reform 
would produce moral individuals by moulding their appetites and their habits 
(Ignatieff, 1978: 45-7). The reforming institutions of society – particularly, 
but not exclusively, the prison and asylum – could be put to the service of 
re-fashioning deviant individuals before returning them as useful subjects 
to the society at large.
This ‘inclusive’ conception of the social-as-totality is undermined as 
the nineteenth century progresses and is eventually supplanted by an idea 
of the social as a discrete and localised network of relationships through 
which individuals manage their own lives. Rather than a totalising system 
of abstract or universal rules and customs, the social came to describe those 
relationships – of family, neighbourhood, employment, community, religion, 
and so on – that connected the different parts of the society together. Of 
particular note is that this conception represented the social as diversity rather 
than homogeneity. Social work consisted in mobilising (different) personal, 
familial, communal and institutional resources on a case-by-case basis. Where 
Bentham had focused on the total institutionalisation of moral conduct and a 
manufactured imprinting of public status, later century reformers located the 
source of morality and the foundations of public status within the families 
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and communities of the distressed themselves. Instead of re-fashioning 
individuals in total institutions, later century reformers wanted to reinvigorate 
and revitalise the communal bonds that held the society together. Of prime 
importance was the family but its proper operation needed to be socially 
secured through the support of friends, neighbours, communities, religious 
and friendly societies and other ‘social agencies’ (see Garland, 1985: 119, 
240). If the reformers held on to Bentham’s idea of society as a great engine 
of moral progress they tempered their abstract faith by arguing that the 
engine needed to lubricated and its parts regularly repaired if it was to run 
at maximum effi ciency.
The conceptual shift described here may be subtle but it is also crucial: it 
furnishes a discourse through which public and private agencies can describe, 
explain, justify and predict the effects of their interventions. It provides, 
also, an experimental apparatus through which combinations of reforming 
practices can be co-ordinated in order to achieve different outcomes. Rather 
than focusing exclusively on reprogramming the deviant individual, social 
reform now turned its attention to re-organising and better managing the local 
contexts that (allegedly) gave rise to deviant individuals. The localised social 
thus marks out a new relationship between the reformers and the objects 
of their practice: instead of conceptualising reform as the total institutional 
manufacture of desirable associations, it was portrayed as a multitude of 
institutional and everyday processes – ones that could be managed, organised, 
supervised, monitored and governed. The social, in short, came to represent a 
micro-political technology for the administration of welfare in practice1  and 
the discipline that later emerged to provide intellectual justifi cation for this 
technological fi x was the aptly named ‘social administration.’
Two points can be drawn from this brief historical refl ection. First, there 
are no innocent ideas of what the social comprises: there is no object or state 
of affairs ‘out there’ that is quintessentially or foundationally social in any 
timeless sense. Ideas about what the social comprises inform the practices of 
those charged with delivering services but they do not in any simple way refl ect 
the real conditions or circumstances of those practices. Second, and closely 
related, the label ‘social worker’ is not a neutral or disinterested descriptor 
of what some groups of professionals do. It is located within particular 
conceptual frameworks about the ways that collective life can be managed, 
supported and threatened. To be sure, the frameworks change (as discussed 
below) but this only reinforces the need for social workers to be critically 




Contemporary ideas about the social character of social work betray the 
infl uence of earlier ideas. There is a clear echo of the Charity Organisation 
Society (COS), for instance, in Jordan’s suggestion that social work ‘begins 
where community has diffi culty in providing.’ and seeks to ‘strengthen the 
bonds of inclusive membership.’ The echo is loudest in his critique of New 
Right market individualism where he extols the virtues of social work’s ‘original 
role in communities’ and raises ‘old questions’ about ‘how it can again help to 
provide the moral glue that every society needs if it is to achieve prosperity 
and harmony’ – even urging a return to social work’s ‘late nineteenth-century 
beginnings.’ There are, of course, some clear differences. Where social work, 
for the COS, aimed to incorporate the distressed and indigent into the 
private institutions of a putatively effi cient and functional society, for Jordan 
it aims to make amends for an iniquitous and malfunctioning one. Those 
in need of social work assistance, for Jordan, do not comprise casualties 
of fate – sickness, bereavement, infi rmity, for example – but casualties of 
‘undesirable social consequences of commercial contractual relations’ or, in 
other words, capitalism (Jordan, 1997, pp.9, 11,13, 21).2 
For Jordan, then, social work theory and practice carries within it not a 
validation (as for the COS) but a critique of society: a critique that exposes 
the broken communities and the social faultlines (the societal fragmentation, 
decline, weakness, polarization and precariousness) infl icted by capitalist 
development. In these circumstances, social work is about gluing together the 
shattered pieces, reconstructing (with improvements) what earlier reformers 
had built. The problem, however, is that there is no pattern and no design 
specifi cations to tell social workers which bits fi t where, nor any indication 
that the moral glue applied will do what it says on the tin. So far from society 
being a great engine of reform manufacturing useful subjects, social workers, 
in Jordan’s world, face something more like a broken piece of fl at-pack 
furniture with no instructions and an infi nite number of parts. Moreover, in 
spite of the number remaining, most of the original parts are missing. The 
traditional communities and the mass solidarities that gave shape to social 
work’s moral mission have been destroyed and many of the organisations that 
linked clients, unions, professions and politics died with them. In this case, 
the nostalgic response – going back in time to get it right – is not a feasible 
option: those specifi c mass solidarities, traditional communities, patterns of 
membership that comprised the now-broken structure cannot be recreated.
An alternative – entrepreneurial – response is to build bridges or make 
connections across the divisions rather than apply rivers of glue to stick them 
together. The vision of social work as bridge-building rests on an entirely 
different concept of what constitutes the social. For example, in contrast to a 
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single broken structure crying out for moral glue, Dominelli suggests that the 
social is ‘created as a fl uid, multidimensional, contradictory, ambiguous and 
uncertain domain,’ providing a ‘contextualized and negotiated space within 
which practice occurs’ (Dominelli, 2004, p.42). There are some tensions in 
this account between the term’s theoretical and descriptive status. In some 
places the social is said to comprise a space between social conventions and 
structural inequalities (p.15). Elsewhere, the social is constituted through the 
‘negotiation of understandings and experienced realities’ (p.42). Elsewhere 
again, it is portrayed as a structure of relations that ‘confi gure culture’ and 
legitimize institutions (p.251). In some places the social is that which mediates 
between cultural divisions (p.43). Elsewhere, the social is that which is 
mediated by social work practitioners (p.251).
Nonetheless, Dominelli’s theoretical argument can be seen to differ from 
Jordan’s in important and fundamental ways. Society is not, in Dominelli’s 
vision, the structure that provides the context for what social workers do. 
Instead, it is a space separating multidimensional domains – of collective 
identity and tradition, of institutions and movements, formal systems and 
informal conventions, economic transactions and cultural affi liations – and 
the social is realised only through negotiations between those domains. In 
this vision, the ‘refl exively critical’ social worker ‘navigates the interstices of 
the social’ or, in other words, sails the seas that separate islands of cultural 
and economic difference. The social work task is not to glue the bits back 
together but, in an updating of Disraeli, to facilitate concourse between 
separated domains (rather than nations). What is social about social work is 
its connectivity: it reaches across the empty spaces gouged out by neo-liberal 
capitalist relations and hooks up networks of support and empowerment. 
Its purpose is not to cement individuals and groups in a monolithic welfare 
structure but to enable communities of difference to create mutually 
supportive confi gurations of services and resources.
Dominelli’s vision may be seen, in some senses, as a modernising of social 
work’s ideological outlook. She assimilates some of social work’s traditional 
moral concerns into a scheme that redraws the sociological picture of what 
those concerns look like in practice. Whilst social work theorists of a leftist 
persuasion tend not to dispute the moral concern there is some disagreement 
over the sociological picture. For example, it has been suggested that 
interstitiality is not a substantial element of what social workers do. It is, 
instead, a consequence of what is being done to social work. Clarke (1996: 
54-5), for example, argues that changes to social work governance have pushed 
social service delivery into the ‘interstices between organisations.’ Social 
workers inhabit these spaces not because of some ontological condition of the 
social itself but because of the destruction of the ancien régime of the post-war 
welfare state wrought principally (but not solely) by the neo-Conservative 
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onslaught from the late 1970s onwards. In Clarke’s (2004) view, the social 
in social policy generally is part of a strategy that challenges assumptions 
of natural difference – based on gender, ‘race’, life stage, among others. The 
social, in effect, is the outcome of struggles to ‘socialise’ inequalities and 
exclusions, to have them recognised as the consequence of what is done to 
people rather than what people are, and is constructed as a ‘site of integrative 
compromises’ (Clarke, 2004, p.55) around state responses to (primarily) class 
inequalities. The defi nition of inequalities as socially produced, rather than 
naturally given, Clarke suggests, ‘produces a view of difference, division and 
inequality as contestable and capable of being redressed’ (p.57). The social, 
as hegemonic project geared towards ‘denaturalising difference,’ confronts 
the ‘partial, contradictory and unstable character of dominant strategies’ of 
political control. As with Dominelli, this theoretical vision of the social as a 
strategy or project sits uneasily alongside Clarke’s descriptive use of the same 
term – where ‘social groups’ and ‘social blocs’ can be mobilised in pursuit 
of (or in opposition to) the socialising agenda of leftist politics (p.70-71). 
Leaving aside these minor conceptual tensions, it is clear that the strategy, 
for Clarke, is a desirable good: an expansive policy of socialising inequalities 
and exclusions becomes a moral duty for a ‘socially just’ welfare system and 
social workers, by extension, are charged with an ethical responsibility to 
contribute to the expansionist project.
A similar argument, couched in different terms, is put forward by Howe 
(1996) where he claims that the social is a ‘discourse’ that has changed over 
time. Howe’s main interest is not in a full-blown history of this discourse but 
in its post-Thatcher character. Like Clarke, Howe proposes that ‘the political 
pendulum has swung away from the social, the collective and the communal 
towards the free but isolated individual’ (Howe, 1996, p.94). It is the swing 
of the pendulum – the altered political vision of the individual and his/her 
environment – that is at the heart of social work’s troubles: the social has 
been (discursively) removed from social work practice and Howe urges its 
return (p.97).
If the contents of my bibliography are representative, much of what has  just 
been outlined is commonsensical and familiar to any trained social worker. 
The social is complicated, precarious, under attack, in danger of disappearing 
altogether unless new alliances are forged to combat the insidious ideologies 
of the New Right which, allegedly, leave the isolated individual powerless 
before the market. The fragmented forms of contemporary resistance may be 
less amenable to collective mobilisation in these days of global, networked, 
fl uid relationships but a return to or an expansion of social welfare demands 
a revitalised political commitment to collectivity – even if the collective is 
redefi ned to include ‘difference’. However, all of these claims rest on the 
assumption that the social encapsulates something desirable about social 
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work: that it is social work’s social component that raises it above the level 
of private troubles and locates it in the realm of public-democratic action. 
The assumption is questionable at least on the grounds that uncertainty 
persists around which version or which parts of the social provide the vehicle 
for making the ascent from private to public, from trouble to action. Howe, 
for example, associates a return to the social with a return to ‘the collective 
and the communal’ but does not defi ne which kinds of communality and 
collectivity he has in mind.
This point is important because it has been claimed that social ‘discourses’ 
do indeed derive from and are embedded in specifi c kinds of communality 
and collectivity: they are not neutral in relation to the world they construct. 
Indeed, elements of this outlook can be found in Clarke’s concern with 
‘formations’ of the welfare-nation-state triad and in Williams’ earlier (1989) 
exploration of the place of family, ’race’ and nation in the development of 
welfare schemes. A strong version of the thesis is put forward by Rojek et 
al. (1988) who portray the social in social work as, variously, an ‘altar of 
self-disclosure’, an ‘environment of organised intimacy’, and a ‘type of social 
consciousness’ (modernism) which ‘views itself and the world as dynamic, 
many-sided, fragmentary, and discontinuous’ (pp.147, 155, 161). Their point 
is that the social character of social work cannot be understood outside of the 
framework of received ideas through which social workers grasp the nature of 
their practical activities. This framework encodes beliefs, values and projects 
that betray their political and ideological locatedness in specifi c kinds of 
communality and collectivity. In particular, they argue, there is not a non-
ideological ‘social’ through or in which social workers can contextualise their 
practice because the very languages used to describe that context – whether 
‘traditional’ or ‘radical’ – ‘are fi rmly embedded in bourgeois society’ and refl ect 
bourgeois demands for the rational administration of the poor (Rojek et al, 
(1988, p.173). What is social about social work, in this vision, is not the 
moral commitment to connectivity, collectivity or communality per se, but 
the rational refl ection of bourgeois ideology and the divisive implementation 
of bourgeois governance. Social work realises communality and collectivity 
not in general and abstract senses but in particular and material senses. Needs 
are grouped, populations are classifi ed, geographies are solidifi ed, boundaries 
are policed and it is these political activities, rooted in bourgeois discourses 
of what collectivity and communality comprise, that produce social work‘s 
social component. Indeed, so insidious is bourgeois ideology in social work 
(and social welfare more generally) thought to be that Rojek et al. are induced 
to drop ‘social’ from their repertoire and extol the virtues of ‘participatory 




Dreams are necessary, says Dominelli (2004, p.241), ‘to envisage alternative 
practices.’ However, in so far as the dreams being discussed here are not 
the random and distorted visions of the sleeper, but organized expressions 
of beliefs, values and ambitions, then it behoves social work to maintain a 
grip on the dream’s unfolding. In other words, it is necessary to offer ‘fl uent 
and theoretical explanations’ of why people got into diffi culties in the fi rst 
place in order to maintain any serious suggestion that social work has a 
progressive remit. In this regard, my aim has been to explore some infl uential 
articulations of social work’s understanding of its social character. What I have 
done is to take a preliminary look at the replacement images and fi gures that 
are fi lling the theoretical vacuum left by the demise of the dream of social 
administration. This exploration has found a mix of contradictory visions and 
ambitions in which some social workers seek to repair a broken structure by 
the application of moral glue; some seek to build bridges across the ‘interstices’ 
of fl uid domains; some seek to expand the size of and collectivize some of 
the structure’s pieces; and others are busy blowing up the bridges, dissolving 
the glue and sailing off on the good ship ‘participatory welfare.’
Social work theory does not develop in a vacuum. It shares concepts and 
diagnoses with many disciplines and I have identifi ed important overlaps 
between social work assessments of the contemporary world and wider social 
science assessments. As social work cannot grasp the social consequences 
of its practical activity without some sophisticated theoretical scaffolding, I 
conclude that social scientifi c theory is necessary content of any forward-
looking social work education programme.
Notes
1. The materialism and associationism of this construct retains vestiges of earlier 
conceptions of social reform, notably Bentham’s proclamation that the reform of 
men amounts to a ‘species of manufacture’ (see Ignatieff, 1990, p.46) in which the 
objective is to make all the separate parts function in well-oiled effi cient synchrony. 
The calculating coldness (to our eyes) of this vision was later challenged through the 
Settlement Movement (amongst others), giving rise to the ideology of ‘community’ in 
social welfare provision whilst the ‘inclusivist’ vision shifted its attention to ideas of 
nation and race. Here, we do not have the space to dig into the ‘community’ construct 
but it provides no more solid conceptual ground than its ‘social’ accomplice.
2. See also Jordan’s more analytical treatment of these questions (Forsythe & Jordan, 
2002)
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